Incomplete preferences over lotteries on a finite set of alternatives satisfying, besides independence and continuity, a property called bad outcome aversion are considered. These preferences are characterized in terms of their specific multi-expected utility representations (cf. Dubra et al., 2004) , and can be seen as generalized stochastic dominance preferences.
Introduction
A familiar way to order probability distributions on a set of alternatives is to use (first or higher degree) stochastic dominance. A typical property of such an (incomplete) ordering or preference is that a positive probability on a bad alternative cannot be compensated by putting high probabilities on better alternatives. For instance, a probability distribution that puts positive probability on the worst alternative can never stochastically dominate another probability distribution that puts less probability on that alternative, not even by putting all remaining probability on a best alternative.
In this paper we study and characterize this typical property, which we call bad outcome aversion (BOA). Specifically, we consider incomplete preferences over lotteries on a finite set of alternatives and assume the classical conditions of (von Neumann and Morgenstern) independence and continuity, so that the 'multi-expected utility' theorem of Dubra et al. (2004) applies. This result characterizes such preferences in terms of representing closed and convex sets of functions. Our main result (Theorem 4.3) characterizes BOA for such preferences in terms of specific elements contained in these representing sets of functions.
1 Thus, our paper offers a broad generalization of stochastic dominance preferences. The literature on stochastic dominance is vast: see Levy (1992) for an overview of theory and applications. For our paper, in particular Fishburn (1976) is of interest. One other direct source of inspiration is our recent work on an application of stochastic dominance preferences in two-person non-cooperative games, see Perea et al. (2006) ; that paper, in turn, builds on Fishburn (1978) .
Section 2 formulates the model and recalls the multi-expected utility characterization of Dubra et al. (2004) . Section 3 studies stochastic dominance preferences and in particular adapts Fishburn (1976) to our context. The bad outcome aversion condition is introduced in Section 4, which also contains our main results. Section 5 concludes.
Preliminaries
Let X := {x 1 , . . . , x n }, where n ≥ 3, be a finite set of alternatives and let ∆ (X) denote the set of probability distributions (lotteries) over X. We also use the letters x, y, . . . to denote elements of X. A preference is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on ∆ (X). If (p, q) ∈ we say that p is (weakly) preferred over q. Instead of (p, q) ∈ we often use the notation p q. We write p q if p q and q p, and p ∼ q if p q and q p. For p ∈ ∆(X) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, p i denotes the probability that p assigns to x i , and p(x) the probability that p assigns to x ∈ X. The degenerate lottery that assigns probability one to the alternative x ∈ X is identified with x. Observe that we do not require completeness of .
The following possible conditions on are well-known.
Axiom 2.1 (Independence) For all p, q, r ∈ ∆ (X) and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
Axiom 2.2 (Continuity) For all q ∈ ∆(X), the sets {p ∈ ∆(X) | p q} and {p ∈ ∆(X) | q p} are closed in ∆(X).
Let U ⊆ R X be a set of real-valued functions on X. For u ∈ R X and a lottery p ∈ ∆(X) denote by
the expectation of p under u. We say that U represents the preference if for all p, q ∈ ∆(X),
The following 'multi-expected utility' theorem follows from Dubra et al. (2004) and generalizes the familiar von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem to incomplete preferences.
Theorem 2.3 Let be a preference. Then satisfies independence and continuity if and only if there is a closed and convex set U ⊆ R
X that represents .
Stochastic dominance
First degree stochastic dominance is a well-known example of a preference to which Theorem 2.3 applies. For any permutation π of {1, . . . , n}, the first degree stochastic dominance preference π is defined by (1) . So first degree stochastic dominance preferences are complete on degenerate lotteries. Conversely, if a preference satisfies independence and strictly orders all alternatives of X, then it contains a first degree stochastic dominance preference. To show this formally, we introduce the following condition. This condition says that, ceteris paribus, shifting probability to a better alternative makes a lottery preferable. 
Lemma 3.3 Let be a preference with either x y or y x for all x, y ∈ X, x = y. Then:
satisfies improvement if and only if π ⊆ .
Proof. Part (i) is obvious. For the 'if' part of (ii), consider p, q, x, y satisfying the conditions in the statement of the improvement axiom. In particular, x = x π(i) and y = x π(j) for some i > j. This implies p π q, and therefore p q.
For the 'only if' part, for simplicity assume π is identity, so that x n . . .
Hence, for i
By (1), q k is well-defined, and q
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4 Let the preference satisfy independence. If there is a permu-
For both illustrative purposes and later reference we now extend first degree stochastic dominance to t-degree stochastic dominance, for any t ∈ R with t ≥ 1. This extension adapts Fishburn (1976) to our setting. We start with the following definition.
Definition 3.5 Let t ∈ R, t ≥ 1. The n × n-matrix A t is defined by (a t ) ij := 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i > j and by
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i ≤ j. Here, Γ denotes the Γ-function
The proof of the following lemma is given in the Appendix to this paper.
Lemma 3.6 For all t, t ∈ R, t, t ≥ 1, we have
Lemma 3.6 implies that, if we define A := A 1 , then we can obtain A t as A to the power t for all t ≥ 1, and therefore we write A t instead of A t in the remainder of this paper.
For t ≥ 1 we define the t-degree stochastic dominance preference t by
for all p, q ∈ ∆(X), where the inequality is coordinate-wise. It is not hard to verify that x n t . . . t x 1 , thus t strictly orders the elements of X. 1 Also, 1 is the first degree stochastic dominance preference associated with this ordering of the elements of X, i.e., 1 is equal to π for π being the identity.
The following lemma collects some further facts about t-degree stochastic dominance. We omit the (straightforward) proofs and only note that these facts extend similar observations about the discrete case t ∈ N, see Perea et al. (2006) .
Lemma 3.7 (i) For all t, t ∈ R with t ≥ t ≥ 1, we have
This lemma implies that t-degree stochastic dominance preferences become more complete inclusion-wise if t becomes large, and that any pair of lotteries is eventually ordered.
The (complete) lexicographic preference LM is defined by
for all p, q ∈ ∆(X), where as before i * := min {i | p i = q i }. The preferences t have the property that as t increases a (potentially small) probability that is put on a bad outcome must be compensated by an increasing weight on a good outcome. In the limit compensation is impossible. This is also expressed by the following corollary to Lemma 3.7.
Corollary 3.8 For all t ∈ R, t ≥ 1, it holds that t ⊆ LM , and
Lemma 3.7 and Corollary 3.8 also imply that for any p, q ∈ ∆(X) with p = q and satisfying the condition on the right hand side of (2), we have q t p for all t ≥ 1. Hence, this is a characteristic property of stochastic dominance preferences. In the next section we formalize this property as an axiom of 'bad outcome aversion' and characterize preferences that, beside continuity and independence, satisfy this axiom.
1 t-degree stochastic dominance can also be defined for different orderings of the alternatives in X, but for simplicity we restrict all definitions here to the ordering x n t . . . t x 1 .
4 Bad outcome aversion
The following axiom captures and generalizes a basic property of stochastic dominance preferences, as explained at the end of the preceding section. The interpretation of this axiom is as follows. Think of x as a 'bad' alternative, on which p puts more weight than q. Then the axiom says that this can never be compensated by the weights put by p on alternatives that are better or at least not worse than x.
Clearly, by Lemma 3.7 and Corollary 3.8, stochastic dominance preferences and the lexicographic preference LM satisfy BOA. More generally, for each permutation π of {1, . . . , n} define the lexicographic preference LM,π by
for all p, q ∈ ∆(X), where
The following proposition says that a preference satisfies BOA and there there are no indifferences between the alternatives in X if and only if it is a subset of some lexicographic preference. 
(i)
satisfies BOA, and x ∼ y for all x, y ∈ X with x = y.
(ii) ⊆ LM,π for some permutation π of {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. The implication (ii) ⇒ (i) is obvious. For the converse implication, take a permutation π such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if i > j then x π(j) x π(i) . (Such a permutation can be seen to exist since x ∼ y for all x = y in X, although it may not be unique.) Let p, q ∈ ∆(X) with p = q and p q. Let
We now characterize BOA for preferences that satisfy independence and continuity and that strictly order all elements of X, by using the multi-expected utility theorem, Theorem 2.3. More precisely, we show that such a preference satisfies BOA if and only if the representing class of functions contains specific elements. 
Proof. We may normalize any u ∈ U such that u(x 1 ) = 0 and u(x n ) = 1. For the 'if' part, let p, q, x satisfy the conditions in the statement of BOA, so x = x i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Let (u k ) k∈N be a sequence with (4) 
We claim that for k sufficiently large,
To show this, it is sufficient to prove that
or, equivalently
for k sufficiently large. This, however, follows by (4). So p q. For the converse, assume that satisfies BOA. Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Fix 0 < π < 1, consider the lottery p = πx i + (1 − π)x i+1 , and for each 0 < ε < 1 − π consider the lottery p ε = (π + ε)x i + (1 − π − ε)x n . By BOA, p ε p, hence there is a u ε ∈ U such that u ε (p) > u ε (p ε ), i.e.,
This implies the existence of a sequence (u k ) k∈N with u k ∈ U and u k (x i ) < u k (x n ) for each k ∈ N such that (4) is satisfied.
We conclude this section with some remarks and a corollary for the case of three alternatives.
Remark 4.4 A consequence of Theorem 4.3 is that, under the additional conditions in the theorem, BOA implies incompleteness of the preference. This is so because a complete preference is represented by a unique 0 − 1 normalized function and, thus, a sequence satisfying (4) cannot exist for every i. 
